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Abstract
In this paper, the problem of distributed detection in tree networks in the presence of Byzantines is
considered. Closed form expressions for optimal attacking strategies that minimize the miss detection
error exponent at the fusion center (FC) are obtained. We also look at the problem from the network de-
signer’s (FC’s) perspective. We study the problem of designing optimal distributed detection parameters
in a tree network in the presence of Byzantines. Next, we model the strategic interaction between the FC
and the attacker as a Leader-Follower (Stackelberg) game. This formulation provides a methodology for
predicting attacker and defender (FC) equilibrium strategies, which can be used to implement the optimal
detector. Finally, a reputation based scheme to identify Byzantines is proposed and its performance is
analytically evaluated. We also provide some numerical examples to gain insights into the solution.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed detection deals with the problem of making a global decision regarding a phe-
nomenon based on local decisions collected from several remotely located sensing nodes. Dis-
tributed detection research has traditionally focused on the parallel network topology, in which
nodes directly transmit their observations or decisions to the Fusion Center (FC) [1] [2] [3].
Despite its theoretical importance and analytical tractability, parallel topology may not always
reflect the practical scenario. In certain cases, it may be required to place the nodes outside
their communication range with the FC. Then, the coverage area can be increased by forming a
multi-hop network, where nodes are organized hierarchically into multiple levels (tree networks).
Some examples of tree networks include wireless sensor and military communication networks.
For instance, the IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee) specifications [4] and IEEE 802.22b [5] support tree
networks.
Typically, a network embodies a large number of inexpensive sensors, which are deployed in an
open environment to collect the observations regarding a certain phenomenon and, therefore, are
susceptible to many kinds of attacks. A typical example is a Byzantine attack. While Byzantine
attacks (originally proposed in [6]) may, in general, refer to many types of malicious behavior,
our focus in this paper is on data-falsification attacks [7]–[16], where an attacker sends false
(erroneous) data to the FC to degrade detection performance. In this paper, we refer to such data
falsification attackers as Byzantines, and the data thus fabricated as Byzantine data.
A. Related Work
Recently, distributed detection in the presence of Byzantine attacks has been explored in [10],
[11], where the problem of determining the most effective attacking strategy for the Byzantines
was investigated. However, both works focused only on parallel topology. The problem consid-
ered in this paper is most related to our earlier papers [12], [16]. In [12], [16], we studied the
problem of distributed detection in perfect tree networks (all intermediate nodes in the tree have
the same number of children) with Byzantines under the assumption that the FC does not know
which decision bit is sent from which node and assumes each received bit to originate from
nodes at depth k with a certain probability. Under this assumption, the attacker’s aim was to
maximize the false alarm probability for a fixed detection probability. When the number of nodes
is large, by Stein’s lemma [17], we know that the error exponent of the false alarm probability
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3can be used as a surrogate for the false alarm probability. Thus, the optimal attacking strategy
was obtained by making the error exponent of the false alarm probability at the FC equal to
zero, which makes the decision fusion scheme to become completely incapable (blind). Some
counter-measures were also proposed to protect the network from such Byzantines.
There are several notable differences between this paper and our earlier papers [12], [16].
First, in contrast to [12], [16], in this paper, the problem of distributed detection in regular tree
networks1 with Byzantines is addressed in a practical setup where the FC has the knowledge
of which bit is transmitted from which node. Note that, in practice, the FC knows which bit
is transmitted from which node, e.g., using MAC schemes2, and can utilize this information to
improve system performance. Next, for the analysis of the optimal attack, we consider nodes
residing at different levels of the tree to have different detection performance. We also allow
Byzantines residing at different levels of the tree to have different attacking strategies and,
therefore, provide a more general and comprehensive analysis of the problem as compared
to [12], [16]. We also study the problem from the network designer’s perspective. Based on the
information regarding which bit is transmitted from which node, we propose schemes to mitigate
the effect of the Byzantines.
B. Main Contributions
In this paper, it is assumed that the FC knows which bit is transmitted from which node.
Under this assumption, the problem of distributed detection in tree networks in the presence of
Byzantines is considered. The main contributions of this paper are summarized below:
• Detection performance in tree networks with Byzantines is characterized in terms of the
error exponent and a closed form expression for the optimal error exponent is derived.
• The minimum attacking power required by the Byzantines to blind the FC in a tree network
is obtained. It is shown that when more than a certain fraction of individual node decisions
are falsified, the decision fusion scheme is completely jeopardized.
• The problem is also investigated from the network designer’s perspective by focusing on
the design of optimal distributed detection parameters in a tree network.
1For a regular tree, intermediate nodes at different levels are allowed to have different degrees, i.e., number of children.
2In practice, one possible way to achieve this is by using the buffer-less TDMA MAC protocol, in which, distinct non-
overlapping time slots are assigned (scheduled) to the nodes for communication. One practical example of such a scheme is
given in [18].
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Fig. 1. A distributed detection system organized as a regular tree (a1 = 2, a2 = 3, a3 = 2) is shown as an example.
• We model the strategic interaction between the FC and the attacker as a Leader-Follower
(Stackelberg) game and identify attacker and defender (FC) equilibrium strategies. The
knowledge of these equilibrium strategies can later be used to implement the optimal detector
at the FC.
• We propose a simple yet efficient reputation based scheme, which works even if the FC is
blinded, to identify Byzantines in tree networks and analytically evaluate its performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model. In Sec-
tion III, we study the problem from Byzantine’s perspective and provide closed form expressions
for optimal attacking strategies. In Section IV, we investigate the problem of designing optimal
distributed detection parameters in the presence of Byzantines. In Section V, we model the
strategic interaction between the FC and the attacker as a Leader-Follower (Stackelberg) game
and find equilibrium strategies. In Section VII, we introduce an efficient Byzantine identification
scheme and analyze its performance. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a distributed detection system organized as a regular tree network rooted at the
FC (See Figure 1). For a regular tree, all the leaf nodes are at the same level (or depth) and
all the intermediate nodes at level k have degree ak. The regular tree is assumed to have a set
N = {Nk}Kk=1 of transceiver nodes, where |Nk| = Nk is the total number of nodes at level k.
We assume that the depth of the tree is K > 1 and ak ≥ 2. The total number of nodes in the
network is denoted as N =
∑K
k=1Nk and B = {Bk}Kk=1 denotes the set of Byzantine nodes
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5with |Bk| = Bk, where Bk is the set of Byzantines at level k. The set containing the number of
Byzantines residing at each level k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is referred to as an attack configuration, i.e.,
{Bk}Kk=1 = {|Bk|}Kk=1. Next, we define the modus operandi of the nodes.
A. Modus Operandi of the Nodes
We consider a binary hypothesis testing problem with two hypotheses H0 (signal is absent)
and H1 (signal is present). Under each hypothesis, it is assumed that the observations Yk,i at
each node i at level k are conditionally independent. Each node i at level k acts as a source in
the sense that it makes a one-bit (binary) local decision vk,i ∈ {0, 1} regarding the absence or
presence of the signal using the likelihood ratio test (LRT) 3
p
(1)
Yk,i
(yk,i)
p
(0)
Yk,i
(yk,i)
vk,i=1
≷
vk,i=0
λk, (1)
where λk is the threshold used at level k (it is assumed that all the nodes at level k use the same
threshold λk) and p(j)Yk,i(yk,i) is the conditional probability density function (PDF) of observation
yk,i under hypothesis Hj for j ∈ {0, 1}. We denote the probabilities of detection and false alarm
of a node at level k by P kd = P (vk,i = 1|H1) and P kfa = P (vk,i = 1|H0), respectively, which
are functions of λk and hold for both Byzantines and honest nodes. After making its one-bit
local decision vk,i ∈ {0, 1}, node i at level k sends uk,i to its parent node at level k − 1, where
uk,i = vk,i if i is an honest node, but for a Byzantine node i, uk,i need not be equal to vk,i. Node
i at level k also receives the decisions uk′,j of all successors j at levels k′ ∈ [k + 1, K], which
are forwarded to node i by its immediate children, and forwards4 them to its parent node at
level k− 1. We assume error-free communication between children and the parent nodes. Next,
we present a mathematical model for the Byzantine attack.
B. Byzantine Attack Model
We define the following strategies PHj,1(k), PHj,0(k) and PBj,1(k), PBj,0(k) (j ∈ {0, 1} and k =
1, · · · , K) for the honest and Byzantine nodes at level k, respectively:
3Notice that, under the conditional independence assumption, the optimal decision rule at the local sensor is a likelihood-ratio
test [19].
4For example, IEEE 802.16j mandates tree forwarding and IEEE 802.11s standardizes a tree-based routing protocol.
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6Honest nodes:
PH1,1(k) = 1− PH0,1(k) = PHk (x = 1|y = 1) = 1 (2)
PH1,0(k) = 1− PH0,0(k) = PHk (x = 1|y = 0) = 0 (3)
Byzantine nodes:
PB1,1(k) = 1− PB0,1(k) = PBk (x = 1|y = 1) (4)
PB1,0(k) = 1− PB0,0(k) = PBk (x = 1|y = 0) (5)
where Pk(x = a|y = b) is the conditional probability that a node at level k sends a to its parent
when it receives b from its child or its actual decision is b. For notational convenience, we use
(P k1,0, P
k
0,1) to denote the flipping probability of the Byzantine node at level k. Furthermore, we
assume that if a node (at any level) is a Byzantine, then none of its ancestors and successors
are Byzantine (non-overlapping attack configuration); otherwise, the effect of a Byzantine due
to other Byzantines on the same path may be nullified (e.g., Byzantine ancestor re-flipping the
already flipped decisions of its successors). This means that every path from a leaf node to the
FC will have at most one Byzantine. Notice that, for the attack configuration {Bk}Kk=1, the total
number of corrupted paths (i.e., paths containing a Byzantine node) from level k to the FC are∑k
i=1Bi
Nk
Ni
, where Bi NkNi is the total number of nodes covered
5 at level k by the presence of
Bi Byzantines at level i. If we denote αk = BkNk , then,
∑k
i=1Bi
Nk
Ni
Nk
=
∑k
i=1 αi is the fraction of
decisions coming from level k that encounter a Byzantine along the way to the FC. We also
approximate the probability that the FC receives the flipped decision x¯ of a given node at level
k when its actual decision is x as βkx¯,x =
∑k
j=1 αjP
j
x¯,x, x ∈ {0, 1}.
C. Binary Hypothesis Testing at the Fusion Center
We consider the distributed detection problem under the Neyman-Pearson (NP) criterion.
The FC receives decision vectors, [z1, · · · , zK], where zk for k ∈ {1, · · · , K} is a decision
vector with its elements being z1, · · · , zNk , from the nodes at different levels of the tree.
Then the FC makes the global decision about the phenomenon by employing the LRT. Due
to system vulnerabilities, some of the nodes may be captured by the attacker and reprogrammed
5Node i at level k′ covers all its children at levels k′ + 1 to K and itself.
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7to transmit false information to the FC to degrade detection performance. We assume that the
only information available at the FC is the probability βkx¯,x, which is the probability with which
the data coming from level k has been falsified. Using this information, the FC calculates the
probabilities πkj,0 = P (zi = j|H0, k) and πkj,1 = P (zi = j|H1, k), which are the distributions
of received decisions zi originating from level k and arriving to the FC under hypotheses H0
and H1. The FC makes its decision regarding the absence or presence of the signal using the
following likelihood ratio test
K∏
k=1
(
πk1,1
πk1,0
)sk (
1− πk1,1
1− πk1,0
)Nk−sk
H1
≷
H0
η (6)
where sk is the number of decisions that are equal to one and originated from level k, and the
threshold η is chosen in order to minimize the missed detection probability (PM) while keeping
the false alarm probability (PF ) below a fixed value δ.6
Next, we derive a closed form expression for the optimal missed detection error exponent
for tree networks in the presence of Byzantines, which will later be used as a surrogate for the
probability of missed detection.
Proposition 1: For a K level tree network employing the detection scheme as given in (6), the
asymptotic detection performance can be characterized using the missed detection error exponent
given below
D =
K∑
k=1
Nk

 ∑
j∈{0,1}
πkj,0 log
πkj,0
πkj,1

 . (7)
Proof: Let Z = [Z1, · · · ,ZN1] denote the received decision vectors from the nodes at level
1, where Zi is the decision vector forwarded by the node i at level 1 to the FC. Observe that,
Zi for i = 1 to N1 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Therefore, using Stein’s
lemma [17], the optimal error exponent for the detection scheme as given in (6) is the Kullback-
Leibler divergence (KLD) [20] between the distributions P (Z|H0) and P (Z|H1). Summation
term in (7) follows from the additive property of the KLD for independent distributions.
Note that, (7) can be compactly written as ∑Kk=1NkDk(πkj,1||πkj,0) with Dk(πkj,1||πkj,0) being the
6This type of problem setup is important, for instance, in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRN). In order to coexist with the
primary user (PU), secondary users (SUs) must guarantee that their transmissions will not interfere with the transmission of the
PU who have higher priority to access the spectrum.
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8KLD between the data coming from node i at level k under H0 and H1. The FC wants to
maximize the detection performance, while, the Byzantine attacker wants to degrade the detection
performance as much as possible which can be achieved by maximizing and minimizing the KLD,
respectively. Next, we explore the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines that degrade
the detection performance most by minimizing the KLD.
III. OPTIMAL BYZANTINE ATTACK
As discussed earlier, the Byzantines attempt to make the KL divergence as small as possible.
Since the KLD is always non-negative, Byzantines attempt to choose P (zi = j|H0, k) and
P (zi = j|H1, k) such that Dk = 0, ∀k. In this case, an adversary can make the data that the FC
receives from the nodes such that no information is conveyed from them. This is possible when
P (zi = j|H0, k) = P (zi = j|H1, k) ∀j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k. (8)
Notice that, πkj,0 = P (zi = j|H0, k) and πkj,1 = P (zi = j|H1, k) can be expressed as
πk1,0 = β
k
1,0(1− P kfa) + (1− βk0,1)P kfa (9)
πk1,1 = β
k
1,0(1− P kd ) + (1− βk0,1)P kd . (10)
with βk1,0 =
∑k
j=1 αjP
j
1,0 and βk0,1 =
∑k
j=1 αjP
j
0,1. Substituting (9) and (10) in (8) and after
simplification, the condition to make the D = 0 for a K-level network becomes
∑k
j=1 αj(P
j
1,0+
P j0,1) = 1, ∀k. Notice that, when
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5, there does not exist any attacking probability
distribution (P j0,1, P
j
1,0) that can make Dk = 0, and, therefore, the KLD cannot be made zero.
In the case of
∑k
j=1 αj = 0.5, there exists a unique solution (P
j
0,0, P
j
1,0) = (1, 1), ∀j that can
make Dk = 0, ∀k. For the
∑k
j=1 αj > 0.5 case, there exist infinitely many attacking probability
distributions (P j0,1, P
j
1,0) which can make Dk = 0, ∀k.
Lemma 1: In a tree network with K levels, the minimum number of Byzantines needed to
blind the FC (or to make Dk = 0, ∀k) is given by B1 =
⌈
N1
2
⌉
.
Proof: The proof follows from the fact that the condition ∑kj=1 αj = 0.5, ∀k, is equivalent
to α1 = 0.5, αk = 0, ∀k = 2, · · · , K.
Next, we explore the optimal attacking probability distribution (P k0,1, P k1,0) that minimizes Dk
when
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5, i.e., in the case where the attacker cannot make D = 0. To analyze
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9the problem, first we investigate the properties of Dk with respect to (P k0,1, P k1,0) assuming
(P j0,1, P
j
1,0), 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 to be fixed. We show that attacking with symmetric flipping
probabilities is the optimal strategy in the region where the attacker cannot make Dk = 0. In
other words, attacking with P k1,0 = P k0,1 is the optimal strategy for the Byzantines.
Lemma 2: In the region where the attacker cannot make Dk = 0, i.e., for
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5,
the optimal attacking strategy comprises of symmetric flipping probabilities (P k0,1 = P k1,0 = p).
In other words, any non zero deviation ǫi ∈ (0, p] in flipping probabilities (P k0,1, P k1,0) = (p −
ǫ1, p− ǫ2), where ǫ1 6= ǫ2, will result in an increase in Dk.
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
In the next theorem, we present the solution for the optimal attacking probability distribution
(P kj,1, P
k
j,0) that minimizes Dk in the region where the attacker cannot make Dk = 0.
Theorem 1: In the region where the attacker cannot make Dk = 0, i.e., for
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5,
the optimal attacking strategy is given by (P k0,1, P k1,0) = (1, 1).
Proof: Observe that, in the region where the attacker cannot make Dk = 0, the optimal
strategy comprises of symmetric flipping probabilities (P k0,1 = P k1,0 = p). The proof is complete
if we show that Dk is a monotonically decreasing function of the flipping probability p.
After plugging in (P k0,1, P k1,0) = (p, p) in (9) and (10), we get
πk1,1 = [β
k−1
1,0 (1− P kd ) + (1− βk−10,1 )P kd ] + [αk(p− P kd (2p)) + P kd ] (11)
πk1,0 = [β
k−1
1,0 (1− P kfa) + (1− βk−10,1 )P kfa] + [αk(p− P kfa(2p)) + P kfa]. (12)
Now we show that Dk is a monotonically decreasing function of the parameter p or in other
words, dDk
dp
< 0. After plugging in πk′1,1 = αk(1−2P kd ) and πk′1,0 = αk(1−2P kfa) in the expression
of dDk
dp
and rearranging the terms, the condition dDk
dp
< 0 becomes
(1− 2P kd )
(
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
− π
k
1,0
πk1,1
)
+ (1− 2P kfa) log
(
1− πk1,1
1− πk1,0
πk1,0
πk1,1
)
< 0 (13)
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Fig. 2. KLD Dk vs. flipping probabilities when P kd = 0.8, P kfa = 0.2, and the probability that the bit coming from level k
encounters a Byzantine is
∑k
j=1 αj = 0.4.
Since P kd > P kfa and βkx¯,x < 0.5, we have πk1,1 > πk1,0. Now, using the fact that
1− P kd
1− P kfa
>
1− 2P kd
1− 2P kfa
and (33), we have
1− 2P kd
1− 2P kfa
[
1− pik1,0
1− pik1,1
− pi
k
1,0
pik1,1
]
< (pik1,1 − pik1,0)
[
1
pik1,1
+
1
1− pik1,0
]
(14)
⇔ 1− 2P
k
d
1− 2P kfa
[
1− pik1,0
1− pik1,1
− pi
k
1,0
pik1,1
]
+
[
pik1,0
pik1,1
− 1
]
< 1− 1− pi
k
1,1
1− pik1,0
. (15)
Applying the logarithm inequality (x − 1) ≥ log x ≥ x− 1
x
, for x > 0 to (15), one can prove
that (13) is true.
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 2. We plot
Dk as a function of the flipping probabilities (P k1,0, P k0,1). We assume that the probability of
detection is P kd = 0.8, the probability of false alarm is P kfa = 0.2, and the probability that the bit
coming from level k encounters a Byzantine is
∑k
j=1 αj = 0.4. We also assume that P k0,1 = P0,1
and P k1,0 = P1,0, ∀k. It can be seen that the optimal attacking strategy comprises of symmetric
flipping probabilities and is given by (P k0,1, P k1,0) = (1, 1), which corroborates our theoretical
result presented in Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
We have shown that, for all k,
Dk(P
k
0,1, P
k
1,0) ≥ Dk(1, 1). (16)
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Now, by multiplying both sides of (16) by Nk and summing it over all K we can show that the
KLD, D, is minimized by (P k0,1, P k1,0) = (1, 1), for all k, in the region
K∑
k=1
αk < 0.5.
Now, we explore some properties of Dk with respect to
∑k
j=1 αj in the region where the
attacker cannot make Dk = 0, i.e., for
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5. This analysis will later be used in
exploring the problem from the network designer’s perspective.
Lemma 3: D∗k = min
(P kj,1,P
k
j,0)
Dk(π
k
j,1||πkj,0) is a continuous, decreasing and convex function of∑k
j=1 αj for
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5.
Proof: The continuity of Dk(πkj,1||πkj,0) with respect to the involved distributions implies the
continuity of D∗k. To show that D∗k is a decreasing function of t =
∑k
j=1 αj , we use the fact
that arg min
(P k0,1,P
k
1,0)
Dk(π
k
j,1||πkj,0) is equal to (1, 1) for
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5 (as shown in Theorem 1). After
plugging (P k0,1, P k1,0) = (1, 1), ∀k, in the KLD expression, it can be shown that
dDk
dt
< 0. Hence,
D∗k is a monotonically decreasing function of
∑k
j=1 αj for
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5. The convexity of D∗k
follows from the fact that D∗k(πkj,1||πkj,0) is convex in πkj,1 and πkj,0, which are affine transformations
of
∑k
j=1 αj (Note that, convexity holds under affine transformation).
It is worth noting that Lemma 3 suggests that minimization/maximization of
∑k
j=1 αj is
equivalent to minimization/maximization of Dk. Using this fact, one can consider the probability
that the bit coming from level k encounters a Byzantine (i.e., t = ∑kj=1 αj) in lieu of Dk for
optimizing the system performance. Observe that, the expression t =
∑k
j=1 αj is much more
tractable than the expression for Dk.
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 3. We
plot min
(P kj,1,P
k
j,0)
Dk as a function of the probability that the bit coming from level k encounters a
Byzantine, i.e., t. We assume that the probabilities of detection and false alarm are P kd = 0.8 and
P kfa = 0.2, respectively. Notice that, when t = 0.5, Dk between the two probability distributions
becomes zero. It is seen that D∗k is a continuous, decreasing and convex function of the fraction
of covered nodes, t, for t < 0.5, which corroborates our theoretical result presented in Lemma 3.
Until now, we have explored the problem from the attacker’s perspective. In the rest of the
paper, we look into the problem from a network designer’s perspective and propose techniques
to mitigate the effect of Byzantines. First, we study the problem of designing optimal distributed
detection parameters in a tree network in the presence of Byzantines.
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)
Dk vs probability that the bit coming from level k encounters a Byzantine for P kd = 0.8 and P kfa = 0.2.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN IN THE PRESENCE OF BYZANTINES
For a fixed attack configuration {Bk}Kk=1, the detection performance at the FC is a function
of the local detectors used at the nodes in the tree network and the global detector used at
the FC. This motivates us to study the problem of designing detectors, both at the nodes at
different levels in a tree and at the FC, such that the detection performance is maximized. More
specifically, we are interested in answering the question: How does the knowledge of the attack
configuration {Bk}Kk=1 affect the design of optimal distributed detection parameters?
By Stein’s lemma [17], we know that in the NP setup for a fixed false alarm probability, the
missed detection probability of the optimal detector can be minimized by maximizing the KLD.
For an optimal detector at the FC, the problem of designing the local detectors can be formalized
as follows:
max
{P k
d
,P k
fa
}K
k=1
K∑
k=1
Nk
∑
j∈{0,1}
P (zi = j|H0, k) log P (zi = j|H0, k)
P (zi = j|H1, k) . (17)
The local detector design problem as given in (17) is a non-linear optimization problem.
Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain a closed form solution for this problem. Also, observe that
the solution space is not constrained to the likelihood ratio based tests. To solve the problem,
we need to find the pairs {P kd , P kfa}Kk=1 which maximize the objective function as given in (17).
However, P kd and P kfa are coupled and, therefore, cannot be optimized independently. Thus, we
first analyze the problem of maximizing the KLD for a fixed P kfa. We assume that P kfa = yk
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and P kd = yk + xk. Next, we analyze the properties of KLD with respect to xk, i.e., (P kd − P kfa)
in the region where attacker cannot blind the FC, i.e., for
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5, in order to study the
local detector design problem. Notice that, in the region
∑k
j=1 αj ≥ 0.5, Dk = 0 and optimizing
over local detectors does not improve the performance.
Lemma 4: For a fixed P kfa = yk, when
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5, the KLD, D, as given in (7) is a
monotonically increasing function of xk = (P kd − P kfa).
Proof: To prove this, we calculate the partial derivative of D with respect to xk. By
substituting P kfa = yk and P kd = yk + xk into (7), the partial derivative of D with respect
to xk can be calculated as
∂D
∂xk
= Nk
∂
∂xk
[
πk1,0 log
πk1,0
πk1,1
+ (1− πk1,0) log
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
]
⇔ ∂D
∂xk
= Nkπ
k′
1,1
(
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
− π
k
1,0
πk1,1
)
,
where πk1,0 and πk1,1 are as given in (9) and (10), respectively and πk′1,1 = (1−βk0,1−βk1,0). Notice
that, (
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
− π
k
1,0
πk1,1
)
> 0
⇔ πk1,1 > πk1,0.
Thus, the condition to make ∂D
∂xk
> 0 simplifies to
πk
′
1,1 > 0⇔ 1 > (βk0,1 + βk1,0) (18)
Substituting the values of βk1,0 and βk1,1, the above condition can be written as:
k∑
j=1
αjP
j
1,0 +
k∑
j=1
αjP
j
0,1 < 1 (19)
⇔
k∑
j=1
αj(P
j
1,0 + P
j
0,1) < 1 (20)
The above condition is true for any 0 ≤ P j0,1, P j1,0 ≤ 1 when
∑k
j=1 αj < 0.5. This completes the
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proof.
Lemma 4 suggests that one possible solution to maximize D is to choose the largest possible
xk constrained to 0 ≤ xk ≤ 1 − yk. The upper bound results from the fact that {P kd , P kfa}Kk=1
are probabilities and, thus, must be between zero and one. In other words, the solution is to
maximize the probability of detection for a fixed value of probability of false alarm. In detection
theory, it is well known that the likelihood ratio based test is optimum for this criterion. Thus,
under the conditional independence assumption, likelihood ratio based test as given in (6) is
optimal for local nodes, even in the presence of Byzantines, and the optimal operating points
{P k∗d , P k∗fa}Kk=1 are independent of the Byzantines’ parameters {αk}Kk=1.
To summarize, optimal local detectors for distributed detection in tree networks are likelihood
ratio based detectors and are independent of the Byzantines’ parameter {αk}Kk=1. We further
explore the problem from the network designer’s (FC) perspective. In our previous analysis, we
have assumed that the attack configuration {Bk}Kk=1 is known and shown that the optimal local
detector is independent of {αk}Kk=1. However, notice that the KLD is the exponential decay rate
of the error probability of the optimal detector. In other words, while optimizing over KLD, we
implicitly assumed that the optimal detector, which is a likelihood ratio based detector, is used
at the FC. Taking logarithm on both sides of (6), the optimal decision rule simplifies to
K∑
k=1
[ak1sk + a
k
0(Nk − sk)]
H1
≷
H0
log η (21)
where the optimal weights are given by ak1 = log
pik1,1
pik1,0
and ak0 = log
1−pik1,1
1−pik1,0
. To implement the
optimal detector, the FC needs to know the optimal weights akj , which are functions of {αk}Kk=1.
In the next section, we are interested in answering the question: Is it possible for the FC to
predict the attack configuration {Bk}Kk=1 in the tree? The knowledge of this attack configuration
can be used for determining the optimal detector at the FC to improve the system performance.
Notice that, learning/estimation based techniques can be used on data to determine the attack
configuration. However, the FC has to acquire a large amount of data coming from the nodes
over a long period of time to accurately estimate {Bk}Kk=1.
In the next section, we propose a novel technique to predict the attack configuration by
considering the following scenario: The FC, acting first, commits to a defensive strategy by
deploying the defensive resources to protect the tree network, while the attacker chooses its best
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response or attack configuration after surveillance of this defensive strategy. Both, the FC and
the Byzantines have to incur a cost to deploy the defensive resources and attack the nodes in
the tree network, respectively. We consider both the FC and the attacker to be strategic in nature
and model the strategic interaction between them as a Leader-Follower (Stackelberg) game.
This formulation provides a framework for identifying attacker and defender (FC) equilibrium
strategies, which can be used to implement the optimal detector. The main advantage of this
technique is that the equilibrium strategies can be determined a priori and, therefore, there is
no need to observe a large amount of data coming from the nodes over a long period of time
to accurately estimate {Bk}Kk=1.
V. STACKELBERG GAME FOR ATTACK CONFIGURATION PREDICTION PROBLEMS
We model the strategic interaction between the FC and the attacker as a Leader-Follower
(Stackelberg) game. We assume that the FC has to incur a cost for deploying the network and
the Byzantine has to incur a cost7 for attacking the network. It is assumed that the network
designer or the FC has a cost budget Cnetworkbudget and the attacker has a cost budget Cattackerbudget 8.
More specifically, the FC wants to allocate the best subset of defensive resources (denoted as
{c˜k}Kk=1)9 from a set of available defensive resources C = (c1, · · · , cn) (arranged in a descending
order, i.e., c1 ≥ c2 · · · ≥ cn), where n ≥ K, complying with its budget constraint Cnetworkbudget to
different levels of the tree network. After the FC allocates the defensive resources or budget
to different levels of the tree network, an attacker chooses an attack configuration, {Bk}Kk=1
complying with his budget constraint Cattackerbudget to maximally degrade the performance of the
network.
Next, we formalize the Stackelberg game as a bi-level optimization problem. For our problem,
the upper level problem (ULP) corresponds to the FC who is the leader of the game, while the
7Due to variations in hardware complexity and the level of tamper-resistance present in nodes residing at different levels
of the tree, the resources required to capture and tamper nodes at different levels may be different and, therefore, nodes have
varying costs of being attacked.
8In this paper, we assume that the attacker budget Cattackerbudget is such that
K∑
k=1
αk < 0.5, i.e., the attacker cannot make
Dk = 0, ∀k. Notice that, if the attacker can make Dk = 0 for some k = l, then, it can also make Dk = 0, ∀k ≥ l. Also,
Dk = 0 implies that pik1,1 = pik1,0 and, therefore, the weights (ak1 , ak0) in (21) are zero. In other words, the best the FC can do
in the case when Dk = 0, ∀k ≥ l is to ignore or discard the decisions of the nodes residing at level k ≥ l. This scenario is
equivalent to using the tree network with (l − 1) levels for distributed detection.
9Let c˜k denote the resources deployed or budget allocated by the FC to protect or deploy a node at level k.
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lower level problem (LLP) belongs to the attacker who is the follower.
maximize
{c˜k}
K
k=1∈C
D({c˜k}Kk=1)
subject to
K∑
k=1
c˜kNk ≤ Cnetworkbudget
minimize
Bk∈Z+
D({Bk}Kk=1)
subject to
K∑
k=1
c˜kBk ≤ Cattackerbudget
0 ≤ Bk ≤ Nk, ∀ k = 1, 2, . . . , K
(22)
where Z+ is the set of non-negative integers. Notice that, the bi-level optimization problem, in
general, is an NP-hard problem. In fact, the LLP is a variant of the packing formulation of the
bounded knapsack problem with a non-linear objective function. This is, in general, NP-hard.
Using existing algorithms, cost set {c˜k}Kk=1 and attack configuration {Bk}Kk=1 can be determined
at the cost of computational efficiency. In this paper, we identify a special case of the above
problem which can be solved in polynomial time to determine the equilibrium strategies. Next,
we discuss the relationships that enable our problem to have a polynomial time solution. We
define profit P (S) of an attack configuration S = {Bk}Kk=1 as follows10
P (S) = D(φ)−D(S) = D(φ)−D({Bk}Kk=1),
where D(φ) is the KLD when there are no Byzantines in the network and D(S) = D({Bk}Kk=1) is
the KLD with {Bk}Kk=1 Byzantines in the tree network. Next, we define the concept of dominance
which will be used later to explore some useful properties of the optimal attack configuration
{Bk}Kk=1.
Definition 1: We say that a set S1 dominates another set S2 if
P (S1) ≥ P (S2) and C(S1) ≤ C(S2), (23)
where P (Si) and C(Si) denote the profit and cost incurred by using set Si, respectively. If
10In this section, we assume that the optimal operating point, i.e., (P k∗d , P k∗fa ), is the same for all the nodes in the tree network.
It has been shown that the use of identical thresholds is asymptotically optimal for parallel networks [21]. We conjecture that
this result is valid for tree networks as well and employ identical thresholds.
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in (23), P (S1) > P (S2), S1 strictly dominates S2 and if P (S1) = P (S2), S1 weakly dominates
S2.
To solve the bi-level optimization problem, we first solve the LLP assuming the solution of the
ULP to be some fixed (c˜1, · · · , c˜K). This approach will give us a structure of the optimal {Bk}Kk=1
for any arbitrary {c˜k}Kk=1, which can later be utilized to solve the bi-level optimization problem.
We refer to LLP as a maximum damage Byzantine attack problem. Observe that, knowing that
the FC chooses (c˜1, · · · , c˜K), the LLP can be reformulated as follows:
minimize
{Bk}
K
k=1
K∑
k=1
NkDk({Bi}ki=1)
subject to
K∑
k=1
c˜kBk ≤ Cattackerbudget
0 ≤ Bk ≤ Nk, and integer ∀k
Next, we discuss the relationships that enable our maximum damage Byzantine attack problem
to admit a polynomial time solution.
A. Analysis of the Optimal Attack Configuration
In this section, we identify a special case of the bounded knapsack problem (LLP) which can be
solved in polynomial time. More specifically, we show that if the set of defensive resources C =
(c1, · · · , cn) satisfy the cost structure cmax ≤
(
min
k∈{1,··· ,K−1}
Nk+1
Nk
)
× cmin11 or c1 ≤ min
k
ak× cn,
then, the optimal solution {Bk}Kk=1 exhibits the properties given in the lemma below.
Lemma 5: Given a K level tree network with cost structure satisfying cmax ≤
(
min
k∈{1,··· ,K−1}
Nk+1
Nk
)
×
cmin, the best response of an attacker with cost budget Cattackerbudget is {Bk}Kk=1 with
B1 =
⌊
Cattacker
budget
c˜1
⌋
and the remaining elements of Bk for 2 ≤ k ≤ K can be calculated recursively.
Proof: To prove Lemma 5, it is sufficient to show that:
1) KLD is a monotonically decreasing function of Bk, and,
2) Attacking parent nodes is a strictly dominant strategy.
11Notice that, in the case of the perfect M -ary tree networks, the proposed cost structure simplifies to cmax ≤M × cmin .
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Lemma 3 suggests that the KLD is a monotonically decreasing function of Bk in the region
where attacker cannot make Dk = 0 and, therefore, (1) is proved. Next, we show that attacking
parent nodes is a strictly dominant strategy. In other words, given a cost budget Cattackerbudget , it is
more profitable for an attacker to attack the parent nodes. Observe that the KLD at level k is a
function of Byzantines’ parameter (B1, · · · , Bk). Thus, we denote it as Dk(B1, · · · , Bk).
In order to prove that attacking parent nodes is a strictly dominant strategy, it is sufficient to
show that the attack configuration S1 = (B1, · · · , Bj, Bj+1, · · · , BK) strictly dominates the attack
configuration S2 = (B1, · · · , Bj−δ, Bj+1+δNj+1Nj , · · · , BK) for δ ∈ {1, · · · , Bj}. In other words,
we want to show that P (S1) > P (S2) and C(S1) ≤ C(S2). From the cost inequality it follows
that C(S1) ≤ C(S2) because cmax ≤ (min
k
Nk+1/Nk)×cmin ⇒ c˜j ≤ (Nj+1/Nj)×c˜j+1. Also, note
that if the attack configuration S1 strictly dominates the attack configuration S2, then, it will also
strictly dominate any attack configuration S˜2 with S˜2 = (B1, · · · , Bj − δ, Bj+1 + δγ, · · · , BK),
where γ ≤ Nj+1
Nj
. Next, we show that P (S1) > P (S2).
Since Dj(B1, · · · , Bj−1, Bj) < Dj(B1, · · · , Bj−1, Bj−δ), for δ ∈ {1, · · · , Bj}, ∀j, it follows
that
Dj(B1, · · · , Bj−1, Bj) < Dj(B1, · · · , Bj−1, Bj − δ)
⇔
j∑
k=1
Dk(B1, · · · , Bk) <
j−1∑
k=1
Dk(B1, · · · , Bk) +Dj(B1, · · · , Bj−1, Bj − δ)
⇔
K∑
k=1
Dk(B1, · · · , Bk) <
j−1∑
k=1
Dk(B1, · · · , Bk) +Dj(B1, · · · , Bj−1, Bj − δ)
+
K∑
k=j+1
Dk(B1, · · · , Bj − δ, Bj+1 + δNj+1
Nj
, Bj+2, · · · , Bk),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Bj
Nj
+
Bj+1
Nj+1
=
Bj−δ
Nj
+
Bj+1+
Nj+1
Nj
δ
Nj+1
and, therefore,
Dk(B1, · · · , Bj, Bj+1, · · · , Bk) = Dk(B1, · · · , Bj − δ, Bj+1 + Nj+1
Nj
δ, · · · , Bk).
This implies that the set S1 strictly dominates the set S2. From the results in Lemma 3, it is
seen that the profit is an increasing function of the attack nodes. Lemma 3 in conjunction with
the fact that attacking parent nodes is a strictly dominant strategy implies Lemma 5.
It can also be shown that the solution {Bk}Kk=1 will be non-overlapping and unique under the
condition that the attacker cannot make Dk = 0, ∀k.
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B. Bi-Level Optimization Algorithm
Based on Lemma 5, in this section we will present a polynomial time algorithm to solve
the bi-level optimization problem, i.e., to find {c˜k}Kk=1 and {Bk}Kk=1. Using the cost structure
cmax ≤
(
min
k
Nk+1
Nk
)
× cmin, the attack configuration {Bk}Kk=1 as given in Lemma 5 can be
determined in a computationally efficient manner. Due to structure of the optimal {Bk}Kk=1, the
bi-level optimization problem simplifies to finding the solution {c˜k}Kk=1 of the ULP.
To solve this problem, we use an iterative elimination approach. We start by listing all
(
n
K
)
combinations from the set C, denoted as, S = {si}(
n
K)
i=1 . Without loss of generality, we assume
that the elements of si = {ci1, · · · , ciK} are arranged in descending order, i.e., cik ≥ cik+1, ∀k.
Notice that, all these
(
n
K
)
combinations will satisfy cik ≤ Nk+1Nk cik+1, because
cik ≤ cmax ≤ min
j
Nj+1
Nj
cmin ≤ min
j
Nj+1
Nj
cik+1 ≤
Nk+1
Nk
cik+1.
Next, we discard all those subsets si from S which violate the network designer’s cost budget
constraint. If the set S is empty, then there does not exist any solution for the ULP. Otherwise,
the problem reduces to finding the subset si which maximizes the KLD. To find the subset si
which maximizes the KLD, using the dominance relationship we start with assigning the cost
c˜1 = min
k∈s
ck1 , where s has the elements which are solutions of argmin
i
⌊
Cattackerbudget
ci1
⌋
. Next, we
discard all those subsets si from S which do not have c˜1 as their first element and solve the
problem recursively.
Pseudo code of the polynomial time algorithm to find {c˜k}Kk=1 and {Bk}Kk=1 is presented as
Algorithm 1.
C. An Illustrative Example
Let us consider a two-level network with N1 = 6 and N2 = 12. We assume that C = {4, 3, 2},
Cnetworkbudget = 60 and Cattackerbudget = 11. Next, we solve the bi-level optimization problem. Observe
that, costs satisfy c1 ≤ 2 × c3. So the algorithm chooses the solution of the ULP as (c˜1 = 4,
c˜2 = 3) and the solution of the LLP as (B1 =
⌊
11
4
⌋
= 2, B2 =
⌊
11−2×4
3
⌋
= 1). To corroborate
these result, in Figure 4, we plot the min
P1,0,P0,1
KLD for all combinations of the parameters B1
and B2 in the tree. We vary the parameter B1 from 0 to 6 and B2 from 0 to 12. All the feasible
solutions are plotted in red and unfeasible solutions are plotted in blue. Figure 4 corroborates
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Algorithm 1 Bi-Level Optimization Algorithm
Require: C = {ck}nk=1 with cmax ≤
(
min
j
Nj+1
Nj
)
× cmin
1: S ← All K out of n combinations {si}(
n
K)
i=1 with elements of si arranged in decreasing order
2: for i = 1 to
(
n
K
)
do
3: if
K∑
k=1
cik ×Nk > Cnetworkbudget then
4: S ← S/si
5: end if
6: end for
7: if S is an empty set then
8: return (φ, φ)
9: else
10: for k = 1 to K do
11: c˜k = min
j∈s
cjk where s has elements which are solutions of argmin
i
⌊
Cattackerbudget
cik
⌋
12: Bk ←
⌊
Cattacker
budget
c˜k
⌋
13: Cattackerbudget ← (Cattackerbudget − c˜kBk)
14: end for
15: return ({c˜k}Kk=1, {Bk}Kk=1)
16: end if
the results of our algorithm.
Notice that, the attack configuration {Bk}Kk=1 is the set containing the number of Byzantines
residing at different levels of the tree. However, the FC cannot identify the Byzantines in the
network. Also, notice that when the adversary attacks more than 50% of nodes at level 1, the
decision fusion scheme becomes completely incapable. In these scenarios, where the FC is
blind, the knowledge of attack configuration will not incur any performance benefit. Next, we
present a reputation-based Byzantine identification/mitigation scheme, which works even when
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Fig. 4. min KLD vs. attack configuration (B1, B2) for Pd = 0.9, Pfa = 0.1.
the network is blind, in order to improve the detection performance of the network. We propose
a simple yet efficient Byzantine identification scheme and analyze its performance.
VI. AN EFFICIENT BYZANTINE IDENTIFICATION SCHEME
In this section, we propose and analyze a Byzantine identification scheme to be implemented
at the FC.
A. Byzantine Identification Scheme
We assume that the FC has the knowledge of the attack model and utilizes this knowledge to
identify the Byzantines. The FC observes the local decisions of each node over a time window
T , which can be denoted by (k, i) = [u1(k, i), . . . , uT (k, i)] for 1 ≤ i ≤ Nk at level 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
We also assume that there is one honest anchor node with probability of detection PAd and
probability of false alarm PAfa present and known to the FC. We employ the anchor node to
provide the gold standard which is used to detect whether or not other nodes are Byzantines.
The FC can also serve as an anchor node when it can directly observe the phenomenon and make
a decision. We denote the Hamming distance between reports of the anchor node and an honest
node i at level k over the time window T by dAH(k, i) = ||UA−UH(k, i)||, that is the number of
elements that are different between UA and UH(k, i). Similarly, the Hamming distance between
reports of the anchor node and a Byzantine node i at level k over the time window T is denoted
by dAB(k, i) = ||UA − UB(k, i)||. Since the FC is aware of the fact that Byzantines might be
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present in the network, it compares the Hamming distance of a node i at level k to a threshold
ηk, ∀i, ∀k (a procedure to calculate ηk is discussed later in the paper), to make a decision to
identify the Byzantines. In tree networks, a Byzantine node alters its decision as well as received
decisions from its children prior to transmission in order to undermine the network performance.
Therefore, solely based on the observed data of a node i at level k, the FC cannot determine
whether the data has been flipped by the node i itself or by one of its Byzantine parent node.
In our scheme, the FC makes the inference about a node being Byzantine by analyzing the data
from the node i as well as its predecessor nodes’ data. FC starts from the nodes at level 1 and
computes the Hamming distance between reports of the anchor node and the nodes at level 1.
FC declares node i at level 1 to be a Byzantine if and only if the Hamming distance of node i
is greater than a fixed threshold η1. Children of identified Byzantine nodes C(B1) are not tested
further because of the non-overlapping condition. However, if a level 1 node is determined not
to be a Byzantine, then, the FC tests its children nodes at level 2. The FC declares node i at
level k, for 2 ≤ k ≤ K, to be a Byzantine if and only if the Hamming distance of node i is
greater than a fixed threshold ηk and Hamming distances of all predecessors of node i is less
than equal to their respective thresholds ηj .
In this way, it is possible to counter the data falsification attack by isolating Byzantine nodes
from the information fusion process. The probability that a Byzantine node i at level k is isolated
at the end of the time window T , is denoted as P isoB (k, i).
B. Performance Analysis
As aforementioned, local decisions of the nodes are compared to the decisions of the anchor
node over a time window of length T . The probability that an honest node i at level k makes a
decision that is different from the anchor node is given by
PAHdiff (k, i)
= P (uAi = 1, u
H
k,i = 0, H0) + P (u
A
i = 0, u
H
k,i = 1, H0)
+P (uAi = 1, u
H
k,i = 0, H1) + P (u
A
i = 0, u
H
k,i = 1, H1)
= P0[(P
k
fa + P
A
fa)− 2P kfaPAfa] + P1[(P kd + PAd )− 2P kd PAd ]
.
= P0[P
AH
diff (k, i, 0)] + P1[P
AH
diff (k, i, 1)] .
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where the prior probabilities of the two hypotheses H0 and H1 are denoted by P0 and P1,
respectively. The probability that a Byzantine node i at level k sends a decision different from
that of the anchor node is given by
PABdiff (k, i)
= P (uAi = 1, u
B
k,i = 0, H0) + P (u
A
i = 0, u
B
k,i = 1, H0)
+P (uAi = 1, u
B
k,i = 0, H1) + P (u
A
i = 0, u
B
k,i = 1, H1)
= P0[P
A
faP
k
fa + (1− PAfa)(1− P kfa)] + P1[PAd P kd + (1− PAd )(1− P kd )]
.
= P0[P
AB
diff (k, i, 0)] + P1[P
AB
diff (k, i, 1)] .
The difference between the reports of a node and the anchor node under hypothesis l ∈ {0, 1}
(i.e., dAI (k, i, l), I ∈ {H,B}) is a Bernoulli random variable with mean PAHdiff (k, i, l) for honest
nodes and PABdiff (k, i, l) for Byzantines. FC declares node i at level k to be a Byzantine if and
only if the Hamming distance of node i is greater than a fixed threshold ηk and Hamming
distances of all predecessors of node i are less than equal to their respective thresholds ηj . The
probability that a Byzantine node i at level k is isolated at the end of the time window T can
be expressed as
P isoB (k, i) = P [(d
A
B(k, i) > ηk), (d
A
H(k − 1, i) ≤ ηk−1), · · · , (dAH(1, i) ≤ η1)]
=
∑
l∈{0,1}
Pl
[
P [dAB(k, i, l) > ηk]
k−1∏
m=1
P [dAH(m, i, l) ≤ ηm]
]
=
∑
l∈{0,1}
Pl

 T∑
j=ηk+1
(
T
j
)
(PABdiff (k, i, l))
j(1− PABdiff (k, i, l))T−j
k−1∏
m=1

 ηm∑
j=0
(
T
j
)
(PAHdiff (m, i, l))
j(1− PAHdiff (m, i, l))T−j



 .
For large T , by using the normal approximation, we get
P isoB (k, i) =
∑
l∈{0,1}
Pl

Q

 ηk − TPABdiff(k, i, l)√
(TPABdiff (k, i, l)(1− PABdiff (k, i, l)))

 k−1∏
m=1
Q

 TPAHdiff(m, i, l)− ηm√
(TPAHdiff(m, i, l)(1− PAHdiff (m, i, l)))



 .
This can be written recursively as follows
P isoB (k + 1, i) =
∑
l∈{0,1}
Pl
[
(1− b(k, l))
(
a(k + 1, l)
a(k, l)
)
P isoB (k, i, l)
]
, (24)
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with P isoB (k, i)
.
=
∑
l∈{0,1}
Pl[P
iso
B (k, i, l)], and
a(k, l) = Q

 ηk − TPABdiff(k, i, l)√
(TPABdiff (k, i, l)(1− PABdiff (k, i, l)))

 ,
b(k, l) = Q

 ηk − TPAHdiff(k, i, l)√
(TPAHdiff (k, i, l)(1− PAHdiff (k, i, l)))

 .
One can choose ηk such that the isolation probability of honest nodes at level k based solely on
its data under the hypothesis Hl (i.e., b(k, l)) is constrained to some value δk << 0.5. In other
words, we choose ηk such that max
l∈{0,1}
b(k, l) = δk, i.e.,
ηk = Q
−1(δk)
√
TPAHdiff(k, i, l
∗)(1 − PAHdiff (k, i, l∗)) + TPAHdiff (k, i, l∗) (25)
where l∗ = argmax
l
b(k, l). Now, the expression for a(k, l) can be written as
a(k, l) = Q

Q−1(δk)
√
PAHdiff (k, i, l
∗)(1− PAHdiff (k, i, l∗)) +
√
T (PAHdiff (k, i, l
∗)− PABdiff (k, i, l))√
PABdiff (k, i, l)(1− PABdiff (k, i, l))


Now using the fact that max
l
PAHdiff (k, i, l) < min
l
PABdiff (k, i, l), it can be shown that (PAHdiff (k, i, l∗)−
PABdiff (k, i, l)) < 0, ∀i and, therefore, lim
T→∞
a(k, l) = 1.
Lemma 6: For a K level tree network, for our proposed Byzantine identification scheme, the
asymptotic (i.e., T →∞) probability that a Byzantine node i at level k+1, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K− 1,
is isolated is lower-bounded by,
k∏
j=2
(1− δj).
Proof: Notice that, lim
T→∞
a(k, l) = 1. The asymptotic performance of the proposed scheme
can be analyzed as follows:
lim
T→∞
P isoB (k + 1, i) =
∑
l∈{0,1}
Pl lim
T→∞
[
(1− b(k, l))
(
a(k + 1, l)
a(k, l)
)
P isoB (k, i, l)
]
≥ (1− δk)
∑
l∈{0,1}
Pl lim
T→∞
[
P isoB (k, i, l)
]
=
k∏
j=2
(1 − δj).
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Fig. 5. Isolation probability P isoB (k, i) vs. time window T .
Notice that, the parallel network topology is a special case of the tree network topology with
K = 1. For K = 1, our scheme can identify all the Byzantines with probability one because
lim
T→∞
P isoB (1, i) = lim
T→∞
∑
l∈{0,1}
Pl[a(1, l)] = 1. When K > 1, we can choose ηk appropriately such
that Byzantines can be identified with a high probability.
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 5 that cor-
roborate our theoretical results. We consider a tree network with K = 5 and plot P isoB (k, i), 1 ≤
k ≤ 5, as a function of the time window T . We assume that the operating points (P kd , P kfa), 1 ≤
k ≤ 5, for the nodes at different levels are given by [(0.8, 0.1), (0.75, 0.1), (0.6, 0.1), (0.65, 0.1), (0.6, 0.1)]
and for anchor node (PAd , PAfa) = (0.9, 0.1). We also assume that the hypotheses are equi-
probable, i.e., P0 = P1 = 0.5, and the maximum isolation probability of honest nodes at level
k based solely on its data is constrained by δk = 0.01, ∀k. It can be seen from Figure 5 that
in a span of only T = 25 time windows, our proposed scheme isolates/identifies almost all the
Byzantines in the tree network.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of optimal Byzantine attacks on distributed detection
mechanism in tree networks. We analyzed the performance limit of detection performance
with Byzantines and obtained the optimal attacking strategies that minimize the detection error
exponent. The problem was also studied from the network designer’s perspective. It was shown
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that the optimal local detector is independent of the Byzantine’s parameter. Next, we modeled
the strategic interaction between the FC and the attacker as a Leader-Follower (Stackelberg)
game and attacker and defender (FC) equilibrium strategies were identified. We also proposed
a simple yet efficient scheme to identify Byzantines and analytically evaluated its performance.
There are still many interesting questions that remain to be explored in the future work such as
analysis of the problem for arbitrary network topologies. The case where Byzantines collude in
several groups (collaborate) to degrade the detection performance can also be investigated.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To prove the lemma, we first show that any positive deviation ǫ ∈ (0, p] in flipping probabilities
(P k1,0, P
k
0,1) = (p, p−ǫ) will result in an increase in Dk. After plugging in (P k1,0, P k0,1) = (p, p−ǫ)
in (9) and (10), we get
πk1,0 = [β
k−1
1,0 (1− P kfa) + (1− βk−10,1 )P kfa] + [αk(p− P kfa(2p− ǫ)) + P kfa] (26)
πk1,1 = [β
k−1
1,0 (1− P kd ) + (1− βk−10,1 )P kd ] + [αk(p− P kd (2p− ǫ)) + P kd ]. (27)
Now we show that Dk is a monotonically increasing function of the parameter ǫ or in other
words, dDk
dǫ
> 0.
dDk
dǫ
= πk1,0
(
πk
′
1,0
πk1,0
− π
k′
1,1
πk1,1
)
+ πk
′
1,0 log
πk1,0
πk1,1
+ (1− πk1,0)
(
πk
′
1,1
1− πk1,1
− π
k′
1,0
1− πk1,0
)
− πk′1,0 log
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
(28)
where
dπk1,1
dǫ
= πk
′
1,1 = αkP
k
d and
dπk1,0
dǫ
= πk
′
1,0 = αkP
k
fa. After rearranging the terms in the above
equation, the condition dDk
dǫ
> 0 becomes
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
+
P kfa
P kd
log
πk1,0
πk1,1
>
πk1,0
πk1,1
+
P kfa
P kd
log
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
. (29)
Since P kd > P kfa and βkx¯,x < 0.5, πk1,1 > πk1,0. It can also be proved that
P kd
P kfa
πk1,0
πk1,1
> 1. Hence, we
have
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1 + (πk1,0 − πk1,1) <
P kd
P kfa
πk1,0
πk1,1
⇔ (πk1,0 − πk1,1)[1 + (πk1,0 − πk1,1)] >
P kd
P kfa
πk1,0
πk1,1
(πk1,0 − πk1,1)
⇔ (πk1,0 − πk1,1)
[
1 + (πk1,0 − πk1,1)
πk1,0(1− πk1,1)
]
>
P kd
P kfa
πk1,0
πk1,1
[
πk1,0 − πk1,1
πk1,0(1− πk1,1)
]
⇔ (πk1,0 − πk1,1)
[
1
1− πk1,1
+
1
πk1,0
]
>
P kd
P kfa
[
πk1,0 − πk1,0πk1,1 + πk1,0πk1,1 − πk1,1
πk1,1(1− πk1,1)
]
⇔
[
1− πk1,1 − (1− πk1,0)
1− πk1,1
+
(πk1,0 − πk1,1)
πk1,0
]
>
P kd
P kfa
[
πk1,0
πk1,1
− 1− π
k
1,0
1− πk1,1
]
⇔ 1− π
k
1,0
1− πk1,1
+
P kfa
P kd
(
1− π
k
1,1
πk1,0
)
>
πk1,0
πk1,1
+
P kfa
P kd
(
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
− 1
)
. (30)
To prove that (29) is true, we apply the logarithm inequality (x − 1) ≥ log x ≥ x− 1
x
, for
x > 0 to (30). First, let us assume that x = π
k
1,0
πk1,1
. Now using the logarithm inequality we can
show that log
πk1,0
πk1,1
≥ 1− π
k
1,1
πk1,0
. Next, let us assume that x =
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
. Now using the logarithm
inequality it can be shown that
[
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
− 1
]
≥ log 1− π
k
1,0
1− πk1,1
. Using these results and (30), one
can prove that condition (29) is true.
Similarly, we can show that any non zero deviation ǫ ∈ (0, p] in flipping probabilities
(P k1,0, P
k
0,1) = (p− ǫ, p) will result in an increase in Dk, i.e.,
dDk
dǫ
> 0, or
πk1,0
πk1,1
+
1− P kfa
1− P kd
log
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
>
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
+
1− P kfa
1− P kd
log
πk1,0
πk1,1
. (31)
Since P kd > P kfa and βkx¯,x < 0.5, πk1,1 > πk1,0. It can also be proved that
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
<
1− P kfa
1− P kd
.
Hence, we have
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1− pik1,0
1− pik1,1
<
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
1− (pik1,0 − pik1,1)
] (32)
⇔ 1− pi
k
1,0
pik1,1(1− pik1,1)
<
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
1− (pik1,0 − pik1,1)
pik1,1
]
⇔ 1
pik1,1(1− pik1,1)
<
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
1− (pik1,0 − pik1,1)
pik1,1(1− pik1,0)
]
⇔ 1
pik
1,0 − pik1,1
[
pik1,0 − pik1,0pik1,1 + pik1,0pik1,1 − pik1,1
pik
1,1(1− pik1,1)
]
<
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
1− (pik1,0 − pik1,1)
pik
1,1(1 − pik1,0)
]
⇔ 1
pik1,0 − pik1,1
[
pik1,0
pik1,1
− 1− pi
k
1,0
1− pik1,1
]
<
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
1
pik1,1
+
1
1− pik1,0
]
(33)
⇔ pi
k
1,0
pik1,1
− 1− pi
k
1,0
1− pik1,1
>
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
pik1,0 − pik1,1
pik1,1
+
pik1,0 − pik1,1
1− pik1,0
]
(34)
⇔ pi
k
1,0
pik1,1
− 1− pi
k
1,0
1− pik1,1
>
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
pik1,0 − pik1,1
pik1,1
+
1− pik1,1 − (1 − pik1,0)
1− pik1,0
]
⇔ pi
k
1,0
pik1,1
+
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
1− 1− pi
k
1,1
1− pik1,0
]
>
1− pik1,0
1− pik1,1
+
1− P kfa
1− P kd
[
pik1,0
pik1,1
− 1
]
. (35)
To prove that (31) is true, we apply the logarithm inequality (x − 1) ≥ log x ≥ x− 1
x
, for
x > 0 to (35). First, let us assume that x = 1− π
k
1,0
1− πk1,1
. Now using the logarithm inequality we
can show that log
1− πk1,0
1− πk1,1
≥ 1 − 1− π
k
1,1
1− πk1,0
. Next, let us assume that x =
πk1,0
πk1,1
. Now using the
logarithm inequality it can be shown that
[
πk1,0
πk1,1
− 1
]
≥ log π
k
1,0
πk1,1
. Using these results and (35),
one can prove that condition (31) is true.
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